William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 34 | Issue 2

2008

Vote Caging as a Republican Ballot Security
Technique
Chandler Davidson
Tanya Dunlap
Gale Kenny
Benjamin Wise

Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
Recommended Citation
Davidson, Chandler; Dunlap, Tanya; Kenny, Gale; and Wise, Benjamin (2008) "Vote Caging as a Republican Ballot Security
Technique," William Mitchell Law Review: Vol. 34: Iss. 2, Article 4.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law

Article 4

Davidson et al.: Vote Caging as a Republican Ballot Security Technique
DAVIDSON - ADC

1/31/2008 11:00:49 AM

VOTE CAGING AS A REPUBLICAN BALLOT SECURITY
TECHNIQUE
Chandler Davidson,† Tanya Dunlap,†† Gale Kenny,††† and
††††
Benjamin Wise
I.
II.
III.

IV.

INTRODUCTION ...................................................................... 533
VOTE CAGING: A DEFINITION ................................................ 536
ARIZONA PRECURSORS TO TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY VOTE
CAGING .................................................................................. 543
A. Challenging Voters in Phoenix Minority Precincts ............... 548
B. Events at a Polling Place in 1962: The 1971 Hearings....... 550
C. Events at a Polling Place in 1962: The 1986 Hearings....... 554
VOTE CAGING SINCE THE 1960S ............................................ 559

I.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, a growing controversy has surrounded efforts
by Republicans to disqualify Democratic voters through the
technique of vote caging. This technique gained national attention
on May 23, 2007 during U.S. House Judiciary Committee hearings
on the firing of nine U.S. attorneys in 2006. The attorneys were
fired for reasons alleged to be improperly political and irrelevant to
1
their job performance.
Monica Goodling, a former senior counsel and White House
liaison to Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, told the committee
† Chandler Davidson is the Radoslav Tsanoff Professor of Public Affairs
Emeritus at Rice University.
†† Tanya Dunlap holds a Ph.D. in History from Rice University. She
currently works as an independent scholar.
††† Gale Kenny holds a Ph.D. in History from Rice University where she is a
Lecturer in the History Department.
†††† Benjamin E. Wise teaches history and academic writing at Harvard
University. He will receive his Ph.D. in History from Rice University in 2008.
1. See generally Fired U.S. Attorneys, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2007 (showing a chart
of the names, pictures, offices, job review excerpts, and cases of the nine fired
attorneys); Amy Goldstein & Dan Eggen, Number of Fired Prosecutors Grows, WASH.
POST, May 10, 2007, at A10.

533
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that Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty, who had recently
resigned as the Justice Department’s number two official, was less
than candid in his February testimony before the U.S. Senate
2
Judiciary Committee. McNulty testified about Timothy Griffin,
who was appointed on an interim basis—without the normal
confirmation hearing—to replace the U.S. attorney in the Eastern
3
District of Arkansas. Griffin was a former opposition researcher
for the Republican National Committee (RNC) and aide to White
4
House political advisor Karl Rove.
According to Goodling,
McNulty did not reveal to the senators information about
allegations that Griffin was involved in “caging” African-American
5
votes in 2004. When Goodling was asked during her testimony to
explain the term, her response was so vague that it was unclear why
she thought McNulty should have revealed information about a
caging operation, and no committee member asked her for
6
clarification. The issue continued to gain attention, particularly
on political blogs, when Griffin suddenly resigned his interim
appointment as U.S. attorney a few days after Goodling’s testimony

2. Dan Eggen & Paul Kane, Goodling Says She ‘Crossed the Line,’ WASH. POST,
May 24, 2007, at A1.
3. Jason McClure & Emma Schwartz, Goodling Admits to ‘Crossing the Line’;
Denies Major Role in Attorney Firings, LEGAL TIMES, May 24, 2007,
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1179911108382&pos=ataglance.
4. Id.
5. Id. McNulty had reportedly angered Goodling, Gonzales, and others in
his earlier congressional testimony, in part because he had said that H. E.
Cummins III, the U. S. Attorney whom Griffin replaced, had been dismissed
“solely to make room for J. Timothy Griffin, who had been named as the
temporary successor with the backing of Karl Rove, the senior White House
political adviser.” David Johnston, Gonzales’s Deputy Quits Justice Department, N.Y.
TIMES, May 15, 2007, at A15. After Goodling’s testimony about the caging,
McNulty strongly denied her assertions. “Ms. Goodling’s characterization of my
testimony is wrong and not supported by the extensive record of documents and
testimony already provided to Congress,” he said in a statement. David Johnston
& Eric Lipton, Ex-Justice Aide Admits Politics Affected Hiring, N.Y. TIMES, May 24,
2007, at A1.
6. Goodling Testifies Before the House Judiciary Committee (CQ Transcripts Wire),
WASH. POST, May 23, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/politics/
transcripts/goodling_testimony_052307.html. In response to the question from
Rep. Linda T. Sanchez, “Can you explain what caging is?” Ms. Goodling stated:
You know, my understanding—and I don’t actually know a lot about it—
is that it’s a direct-mail term that people who do direct mail, when they
separate addresses that may be good versus addresses that may be bad.
That’s about the best information that I have, is that it’s a direct mailterm that’s used by vendors in that circumstance.
Id.
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and shortly before his Senate confirmation hearing would have
7
been held. In a speech recorded on C-Span, he strongly denied
having participated in vote caging, although he also did not define
8
it.
As these events were unfolding, the updated paperback edition
9
of Armed Madhouse by Greg Palast, a muck-raking American
journalist employed by the BBC, appeared in bookstores across the
nation. Following Goodling’s testimony, Palast also became active
in the liberal blogosphere, describing what he called Republican
“vote caging” efforts in 2004 that focused on Jacksonville, Florida, a
10
Indeed, it was
city with a large African-American population.
primarily because Palast publicized the events in Florida that the
11
issue received as much attention as it did.
In June 2007, Democratic Senators Edward Kennedy and
Sheldon Whitehouse sent a letter to Attorney General Gonzales
requesting, to no avail, information about Griffin’s role in the 2004
12
Invoking executive privilege, the Bush
vote caging operation.
administration has refused to honor requests and subpoenas issued
by both the House and Senate Judiciary Committees regarding the
firing of the U.S. attorneys and related events that would have shed
7. See Posting of Max Brantley to Arkansas Blog, It’s Official,
http://www.arktimes.com/blogs/arkansasblog/ (May 30, 2007, 17:58 CST).
8. Tim Griffin on Vote Caging (C-Span television broadcast June 14, 2007),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TeDrHjagQCk; see also E-mail from Kelly
Porter to Tim Griffin et al., Research Dir. and Deputy Commc’ns Dir. Republican
Nat’l Comm. (Aug. 25, 2004, 17:47 EST), http://2004.georgewbush.org/dead
letteroffice/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2007) (stating the caging total to date was 1771
and attaching a spreadsheet of the caging list).
9. GREG PALAST, ARMED MADHOUSE: FROM BAGHDAD TO NEW ORLEANS—
SORDID SECRETS AND STRANGE TALES OF A WHITE HOUSE GONE WILD (2007).
10. Greg Palast, New Florida Vote Scandal Feared, BBC NEWS, Oct. 26, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/newsnight/3956129.stm.
11. See PALAST, supra note 9, at 199–208 (detailing Palast’s account of caging
efforts in Florida in 2004); see also Palast, supra note 10; Newsnight Report (BBC
television broadcast Oct. 26, 2004), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IkvWkwv7
UVo. Palast’s trademark hyperbole apparently causes the mainstream media to
take him with a grain of salt and may partly account for their unwillingness to give
serious attention to his caging charges. See, e.g., Greg Palast, Editorial, Media as
Lapdog, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2007, at A33 (condemning U.S. mainstream media
culture for allowing the story of voter challenges of African Americans in the 2004
election to slip through the cracks). “The truth is, I knew a story like this one
would never be reported in my own country. Because investigative reporting . . . is
dying.” Id.
12. Press Release, Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, Senators Demand DOJ
Investigation into Voter Suppression Allegations (June 18, 2007), available at
http://www.whitehouse.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=277168.
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13

additional light on the subject.
Thus, it is impossible at this
writing to determine the precise facts behind Griffin’s “caging”
14
memos. After Goodling’s testimony, the mainstream press has
generally ignored the story, relegating it primarily to the
15
blogosphere and on-line venues.
II. VOTE CAGING: A DEFINITION
At this juncture, the primary value of the controversy has been
to raise troubling questions about vote caging—or “voter caging,”
an equivalent term—as it has been practiced and may be practiced
in the future. The purpose of this article is to define it, point to
phenomena that often accompany it, and shed light on its history
by rehearsing a noteworthy account of it that occurred more than
fifty years ago and may have served as a model for its subsequent
use.
The term “vote caging” (or “caging”) as referring to a process
leading to voter challenges is of recent vintage. No major
dictionary or political science reference work mentions them, nor
16
does a leading legal casebook published as recently as 2007. The
13. Greg Gordon, Bush Invokes Executive Privilege for Rove in Attorney Firings,
MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS, Aug. 1, 2007, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/homepage/
story/18637.html.
14. See generally id. (stating that the decision throws a roadblock in the way of
the investigation).
15. See Dahlia Lithwick, Raging Caging: What the Heck is Vote Caging, and Why
Should We Care?, SLATE, May 31, 2007, http://www.slate.com/id/2167284/page
num/all/#page_start; see also Greg Gordon, ‘Vote Caging’ Allegations Arise in Probe of
U.S. Attorney Firings, SACRAMENTO BEE (Cal.), June 25, 2007, at A7; PBS Now: Voter
Caging & Housing Works (PBS television broadcast July 27, 2007), available at
http://www.pbs.org/now/shows/330/index.html.
16. “Vote caging” or “caging” as a reference to voter challenges does not
appear in WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1993) or in MERRIAMWEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003). No general or political
science dictionary published as late as 2004 of which we are aware contains an
entry for the terms. See, e.g., ALAN ABRAMOWITZ, VOICE OF THE PEOPLE: ELECTIONS
AND VOTING IN THE UNITED STATES (2004); FRANK BEASLEY, THE BLACKWELL
DICTIONARY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE (1999); PHILIP JOHN DAVIES, US ELECTIONS TODAY
(2d ed. 1999); JOHN L. MOORE, ELECTIONS A TO Z (1999); THE REFERENCE SHELF:
THE U.S. ELECTION SYSTEM (Paul McCaffrey ed., 2004). Nor does a scholarly
overview of vote suppression techniques in the United States published in 2006
mention the terms. See SPENCER OVERTON, STEALING DEMOCRACY: THE NEW
POLITICS OF VOTER SUPPRESSION (2006). A brief overview of the same subject by a
non-profit organization the same year also does not mention the terms. See
PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY, THE NEW FACE OF JIM CROW: VOTER SUPPRESSION IN
AMERICA (2006), available at http://www.pfaw.org/pfaw/general/default.aspx?oid
=29392222. Nor do the terms appear in the index of the 2007 edition of a leading
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on-line Double-Tongued Dictionary, however, which describes itself as
“a lexicon of fringe English, focusing on slang, jargon, and new
words,” has an entry for “caging: n. the processing of responses to a
fund-raising or marketing campaign, especially when concerning
17
money.”
Apparently, the etymology of the term is based on the
numerous cubbyholes or “cages” where mail used to be sorted by
18
The Double-Tongued Dictionary’s
postal workers called “cagers.”
examples of usage go back to 1981, but only one concerns vote
caging, a quote from Greg Palast in the November 2, 2004 Baltimore
Chronicle: “The GOP’s announced plan to block 35,000 voters in
Ohio ran up against the wrath of federal judges; so, in Florida, what
appear to be similar plans had been kept under wraps until the
19
discovery of documents called ‘caging’ lists.”
Due to the prominence of the U.S. attorney firings scandal,
the term “caging,” connoting voter-suppression, can be found in
20
Wikipedia. In addition, various blogs, publications by non-profit
organizations, and on-line news sources provide definitions as well
21
as examples.
For purposes of this essay, vote caging is defined as a threestage process designed to identify persons in another party or
faction whose names are on a voter registration list, but whose legal

election law casebook. SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL
STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS (3d ed. 2007).
17. Double-Tongued Dictionary, http://www.doubletongued.org/index.
php/dictionarycitations/caging/(last visited Dec. 30, 2007).
18. Paul Kiel, Cage Match: Did Griffin Try to Disenfranchise African-American
Voters in 2004?, TPM MUCKRAKER, June 26, 2007, http://www.tpmmuckraker.com/
archives/003523.php.
19. Double-Tongued Dictionary, supra note 17.
20. See Caging, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caging_list (last
visited Dec. 15, 2007).
21. See, e.g., Posting of J. Gerald Herbert to Campaign Legal Center, Inside
the Vote Cage: Griffin, Goodling, and McNulty (No, Not Another Law Firm),
http://www.clcblog.org/blog_item-138.html (June 20, 2007); Posting of J. Gerald
Hebert & Brian Dupre to Campaign Legal Center Blog, Vote Caging and the
Attorney General, http://www.clcblog.org/blog_item-152.html (July 23, 2007);
Teresa James, Caging Democracy: A 50-Year History of Partisan Challenges to Minority
Voters, Project Vote (Sept. 2007), available at http://projectvote.org/fileadmin/
ProjectVote/Publications/Caging_Democracy_Report.pdf; Whitehouse, supra
note 12; Justin Levitt & Andrew Allison, A Guide to Voter Caging, Brennan Center
for Justice (June 2007), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/dynamic/sub
pages/download_file_49608.pdf; Justin Levitt & Andrew Allison, Reported Instances
of Vote Caging, Brennan Center for Justice (June 2007), available at
http://www.brennancenter.org/dynamic/subpages/download_file_49609.pdf.
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qualification to vote is dubious, and then to challenge their
qualification either before or on Election Day. Ostensibly, caging is
an attempt to prevent voter fraud. In practice, it may have the
effect of disenfranchising voters who are legitimately registered.
In the first stage, political operatives typically identify a
geographic area with a disproportionate number of registered
voters who belong to a different party from that of the operatives.
In the second stage, the operatives send first-class, do-not22
forward letters (sometimes by registered mail) to people in the
identified areas, sometimes asking them to perform a simple task
that includes responding by mail to the original letter. All letters
returned to the senders unopened are assumed to indicate the
addressees no longer live at the address that appears on the
registration rolls, and therefore may not be legally entitled to vote.
Their names are then put on a “caging list.”
In the third stage, political operatives allied with those who
constructed the caging list may appear on Election Day at the
polling places where those people whose letters were returned
unopened may try to vote. The votes are then challenged, either by
the partisan operatives or by election officials who have been
supplied with their names by the operatives, depending on the
state’s laws.
If the challenged voter had moved out of the precinct she tried
to vote in, she would—in many cases—be unable to vote there, as
well as in the precinct she actually inhabited, without having reregistered, although she might still be able to cast a provisional
ballot. Moreover, the challenge process takes time. If there is a
long line of voters, multiple challenges—whether successful or
not—can slow the voting process and discourage legitimate voters
waiting in line from voting. For the most part, the challenged
voters would presumably tend to vote for the party of those whose
votes were caged, given that the original do-not-forward letters were
targeted at geographical areas containing a disproportionate
number of registrants from the opposing party.
In addition, if some of the voters waiting in line and observing
the challengers suddenly had doubts about their own voter
qualifications—justified or otherwise—they too might drop out of
the line. While it is not a necessary aspect of caging, operatives
representing the cagers sometimes encourage this eventuality by
22.

See Levitt & Allison, A Guide to Voter Caging, supra note 21, at ¶ 3.
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distributing handbills, putting up signs, making phone calls, or
placing radio ads that contain false information about voter
qualifications and stress dire legal consequences of breaking the
law. For example, the following sign was put up in a Democratic
precinct on or near Election Day 2002 in Baltimore: “COME OUT
TO VOTE ON NOVEMBER 6th. BEFORE YOU COME TO VOTE
MAKE SURE YOU PAY YOUR: PARKING TICKETS, MOTOR
VEHICLE TICKETS, OVERDUE RENT, AND MOST IMPORTANT
23
ANY WARRANTS.”
Of course, none of the items mentioned in the sign were
required to be paid or quashed in order to vote. Moreover,
election day that year was the fifth of November, not the sixth.
Another tactic with the same intimidating purpose is to station at
the polling place off-duty police officers or people in official24
seeming uniforms, sometimes carrying side arms.
A bill
introduced by Senator Barack Obama, called the Deceptive
Practices and Voter Intimidation Prevention Act, is currently being
25
The Act would make such tactics a
considered in Congress.
26
crime.
The hope of discouraging potential voters with these
techniques is premised on the assumption that a disproportionate
number of people in the targeted precincts will be uneducated,
unsure of their voting rights, unreasonably fearful they might break
an election law, unable to take the time necessary to establish that

23. Anne-Marie Cusac, Bullies at the Voting Booth, THE PROGRESSIVE, Oct. 2004,
available at http://www.commondreams.org/views04/0917-09.htm. This article
also provides interesting examples of voting information, containing the wrong
date, being handed out in predominantly Democratic districts. Id.
24. CHANDLER DAVIDSON, TANYA DUNLAP, GALE KENNY, & BENJAMIN WISE,
REPUBLICAN BALLOT SECURITY PROGRAMS: VOTE PROTECTION OR MINORITY VOTE
SUPPRESSION—OR BOTH? 50 (2004), available at http://www.votelaw.com/blog/
blogdocs/GOP_Ballot_Security_Programs.pdf
[hereinafter DAVIDSON ET AL.]
(discussing the RNC-directed New Jersey Ballot Security Program in 1981).
Similar events in 1988 occurred on the opposite coast in Orange County,
California. Id. at 68.
25. Deceptive Practices and Voter Intimidation Prevention Act, S. 453, 110th
Cong. (2007), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?db
name=110_cong_bills&docid=f:s453rs.txt.pdf; see also Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson,
Election Fraud and the Initiative Process: A Study of the 2006 Michigan Civil Rights
Initiative, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 889, 933 n.243 (2007); Matthew Hay Brown, Senate
Bill Outlaws Campaign Trickery; Cardin Backs Curb on Bogus Endorsements, BALTIMORE
SUN (Md.), Feb. 1, 2007, at 5B.
26. Id.
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27

they are legally registered, or are indeed unqualified to vote. If
many do-not-forward letters have been returned, at least some of
those on the registration rolls are probably unqualified to vote,
which gives some credence to the cagers’ claim that their sole
concern is detecting and preventing fraud instead of discouraging
legal voters from voting. For, at its core, caging can only gain favor
in the court of public opinion if it is successfully portrayed as an
anti-fraud measure, not a partisan vote-suppression technique.
Even if vote caging were used solely to prevent illegal voting in
the populace at large, there are serious problems with the method
as we have described it. For example, to the extent that party
operatives target only members of another party, it is clear that
fraud prevention is not the sole or even primary purpose of the
caging operation. The subtext is that only fraud in the opposing
party is worth exposing, to diminish its power, while the cagers’
party’s potential illegal voters are ignored.
In addition, there are several reasons why a “Do Not Forward”
letter can be returned to the sender. First, the letter might have
mistakenly been delivered to the wrong address or not delivered at
all. Voting rights lawyer Dayna Cunningham has marshaled
evidence to raise serious questions about the fairness of challenges
28
or purges based on address verification.
Among the most
29
important of these is poor mail delivery in low-income areas. Both
Internal Revenue Service and census data “suggest that a major
contributor to low response rates in minority communities may be
30
ineffective mail delivery.”
Second, “partisan activists can make mistakes—unintentional
or otherwise—in matching the names on the returned letters with
the names on the registration lists they are using” (i.e., mistaking
31
“Jameson” for “Jamison”). In addition, two or more people with
32
exactly the same name can be confused with each other.
Third, if the letter is registered, the intended recipient may
actually have lived at the address, but was not home to sign for the
letter when it was delivered. For example, in his book, Palast
27. See generally Cusac, supra note 23 (discussing attempts to confuse or
frighten voters).
28. See generally Dayna L. Cunningham, Who Are to be the Electors? A Reflection on
the History of Voter Registration in the United States, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 370 (1991).
29. Id. at 393–94.
30. Id.
31. DAVIDSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 18.
32. See id. at 18.
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claimed that some of the targeted recipients of caging mail in
Jacksonville in 2004 were actually serving abroad in the Armed
33
Services.
Finally, the registration list the cagers worked with might have
34
been out of date or inaccurate.
In spite of these important sources of error, once a voter’s
name is on the cagers’ list, he is the target of a challenge, even if
35
Then, “[e]ach [person] confronted by a
qualified to vote.
36
challenge slows down the line.” Whether voters persevere or give
up depends on how confident they are, how knowledgeable about
37
the voting process, and how aggressive the challenger. But even if
voters persevere, they may be required to cast a provisional ballot
38
until the status of their registration is established. Unfortunately,
39
not all such ballots are counted. A survey of provisional ballots
nationwide in 2004 found that only sixty-eight percent of the 1.6
40
million ballots cast were counted.
From this description of the process of vote caging, one can
see that it works best as a means of suppressing votes when the
population targeted is relatively uneducated, particularly about
election laws.
Vote caging in a wealthy, highly educated
neighborhood would be unlikely to net a sizable percentage of
returned unopened letters. The chances that letters returned in
such a neighborhood were indicative of people who had either
moved and were likely to try to vote in their old precinct, or who
were disqualified from voting for some other reason, are small
when compared to poor neighborhoods. The logic of the process
thus recommends that it be used primarily in the latter areas.
Moreover, when low-income, low-education precincts also happen
to be largely populated by African-Americans, the voters will usually
41
be Democrats. While not as Democratic as blacks, Latinos in poor
33. PALAST, supra note 9, at 204.
34. Cunningham, supra note 28, at 387–88, 403.
35. DAVIDSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 18.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See SOLUTION OR PROBLEM? PROVISIONAL BALLOTS IN 2004 1, 2 (2005),
available at http://www.electionline.org/Portals/1/Publications/ERIP10Apr05.pdf
(discussing provisional voting status).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 5.
41. See DAVIDSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 13–14; RICHARD J. ELLIS ET AL., THE
ELECTIONS OF 2000, 64–65 tbl. 3-1 (2001) (showing that ninety percent of voting
African Americans voted for the Democratic presidential candidate in 2000, and
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neighborhoods—except for anomalies such as Cuban-Americans—
42
also present a logical target for vote caging.
Students at predominantly black colleges are more likely to be
43
While not poorly
Democrats and, therefore, another target.
educated, they are not yet experienced voters; they are probably
not as well-versed in the basics of registration requirements and
procedure. Accordingly, they are vulnerable to the kinds of
misinformation mentioned above. Moreover, if do-not-forward
letters are sent to their campus addresses during summer vacation,
44
the chances they will receive them are diminished.
Thus, while caging is a technique that could be employed by
partisans of any party, its logic suggests that it is primarily employed
by Republicans against Democrats, especially those in areas with
heavily African-American and Latino concentrations. Moreover,
there is evidence that this technique has been in use for many
years, regardless of the fact that targeting race in caging may be
45
illegal under the Voting Rights Act.

showing a link between a lower income and a Democratic or Independent vote);
id. at 68 (discussing a strong correlation between voter’s income and culture and
their choice of candidate).
42. DAVIDSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 13–14. See, e.g., ELLIS ET AL., supra note
42, at 64–65 tbl. 3-1 (showing that sixty-two percent of Latino voters chose the
Democratic presidential candidate in 2000). Compare Jeffrey Gettleman, On
Politics; A Cuban Revolution, Only It’s in New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2006, at 14NJ
(stating that Cuban-American voters in New Jersey are primarily Democrats), with
Christopher Marquis, It’s Republican vs. Republican on Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, July 28,
2002, at 18 (stating that Cuban-American voters have been a core constituency for
Republican candidates in Florida).
43. While some predominantly black colleges have long been targets of vote
suppression, students at other colleges may also become victims of both
Democratic and Republican efforts. See ELLEN KOLASKY & LORA WONDOLOWSKI,
LEAGUE OF CONSERVATION VOTERS EDUCATION FUND, NOT HOME, NOT WELCOME:
BARRIERS TO STUDENT VOTERS (2004), available at http://www.lcveducation.org/
programs/polling-research/LCVEF_PD-Barriers-to-Student-Voting_2004-Rpt.pdf.
For examples of historically black colleges as targets of vote suppression, see
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, PROTECTING MINORITY VOTERS:
THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AT WORK 1982-2005, 65–66 (2006), available at
http://www.votingrightsact.org/report/finalreport.pdf.
44. The director of the counseling center at historically black Edward Waters
College in Jacksonville commented on the small likelihood that students at his
college would have received the caging letters they were sent by Republicans
during the summer vacation of 2004. PBS Now: Voter Caging & Housing Works,
supra note 15.
45. See The Voting Rights Act § 10(b), 42 U.S.C. 1973i (2006).
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III. ARIZONA PRECURSORS TO TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY VOTE CAGING
One widely discussed example of the caging described above
46
occurred in Arizona in the late 1950s and early 1960s. It received
wide publicity when William H. Rehnquist was nominated to the
U.S. Supreme Court in 1971 and to the office of Chief Justice in
47
1986. The following is an account of the Arizona ballot security
program Rehnquist participated in, a component of which involved
vote caging, and the challenges and harassment of African48
American and Latino voters in Phoenix. The story not only sheds
light on racially discriminatory caging, it also indicates the longevity
of the procedure. Moreover, it demonstrates that caging is not
necessarily conducted by shady individuals or organizations.
Sometimes, as in Phoenix, respected members of the community,
49
in their capacity as party leaders, are responsible for caging.
The account of Justice Rehnquist’s confirmation hearings and
the famous controversy over his participation in vote caging
activities might, at first reading, seem to play an inordinate role in
the present analysis of vote caging. But it is largely because of the
Senate hearings on his nominations in 1971 and 1986 that the logic
of vote caging and its abuses as a ballot security technique are so
well documented. It is also worth noting that Rehnquist’s possible
participation—while a major element in the hearings’ drama—is
not germane to the larger issue of whether racially discriminatory
vote caging efforts by the Phoenix Republican Party occurred, and
if so, how they worked. The evidence is clear that some of those
efforts were racially targeted and involved threats and intimidation
in minority precincts.
GOP ballot security programs gained national attention in the
fall of 1971, after President Richard Nixon nominated William

46. DAVIDSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 17–21. Other cities were also the
source of much debate regarding voter fraud and voter challenging strategies. See
id. at 33–38 (citing instances in Chicago, Los Angeles, and Houston among
others).
47. Id. at 19–21 (describing controversy around Rehnquist’s nomination to
the Supreme Court); id. at 21–24 (describing even greater debate surrounding his
nomination to Chief Justice).
48. Id. at 15–24.
49. For example, Rehnquist, a future Supreme Court Chief Justice and
prominent Phoenix attorney, who was serving as co-chairman of the GOP ballot
security program in 1960, had a role in training challengers using some of these
questionable tactics. See id. at 21–24.
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50

Rehnquist to the U.S. Supreme Court. The nomination surprised
observers. Nixon and his staff had kept their consideration of
Rehnquist quiet; Nixon, in fact, had decided on him only the day
51
before the public announcement. The president’s hesitation and
52
In 1969,
secrecy resulted from previous confirmation battles.
opposition to Nixon’s Supreme Court nominees, conservative
southerners Clement Haynsworth and G. Harrold Carswell, forced
53
A weary Senate later
the president to withdraw their names.
54
confirmed Harry Blackmun and Warren Burger.
In 1971, few
senators opposed Nixon’s nomination of Lewis Powell, but public
concern about Rehnquist’s stance on civil rights arose soon after
55
the surprise announcement. Opponents believed he had worked
against the civil rights of minority voters, and part of the evidence
they offered was information about his involvement in the Arizona
56
Republican Party and GOP ballot security programs.
Rehnquist became active in the Arizona Republican Party after
completing his clerkship for Supreme Court Justice Robert H.
57
Jackson in June 1953. It was an exciting time to join the Arizona
50. See id. at 19–21 (describing how the 1971 hearings, by challenging
Rehnquist and his debatable civil rights record, became a catalyst for exploring
tactics used in ballot security programs).
51. Justices Hugo Black and John Harlan fell ill and left two vacancies on the
court in September 1971. JOHN DEAN, THE REHNQUIST CHOICE: THE UNTOLD STORY
OF THE NIXON APPOINTMENT THAT REDEFINED THE SUPREME COURT 31–34 (2001).
Nixon wanted a southerner, a conservative, and a relatively young candidate. Id. at
31–59. After considering several candidates, he finally settled on Lewis Powell and
Rehnquist. Id. at 241–64. The latter had been responsible for vetting the
candidates in the Department of Justice until his name was taken seriously into
consideration. See id. for detailed information on the nominating process.
52. DONALD E. BOLES, MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, JUDICIAL ACTIVIST 3–5 (1987);
DEAN, supra note 51, at 14–29.
53. DEAN, supra note 51, at 14–23.
54. Dean argues that Nixon intended to significantly reshape the court when
he became president, even intimidating Supreme Court justices to try to secure
their resignations. Id. at 1–9.
55. See DAVIDSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 19–21 (a number of scholars and
civil rights activists weighed in during the hearings); DEREK DAVIS, ORIGINAL
INTENT: CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND THE COURSE OF AMERICAN CHURCH/STATE
RELATIONS 6–7 (1991) (explaining that despite his reputation and qualifications,
Rehnquist’s record rejecting various anti-discrimination measures became a
source of concern).
56. See DAVIDSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 19–21.
57. William Hubbs Rehnquist was born on October 1, 1924 in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin. DAVIS, supra note 55, at 3–6. He graduated Phi Beta Kappa with a
degree in political science from Stanford in 1948. Id. He later earned an M.A. in
political science from Stanford and an M.A. in government from Harvard. Id. In
1952 he graduated from Stanford Law School and then clerked for Justice Jackson
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GOP. The state became a Democratic stronghold in the 1930s,
with the number of Republican registered voters declining to an
58
all-time low of twelve percent by 1940. The narrow victories of
Republicans Barry Goldwater to the U.S. Senate and John Rhodes
to the U.S. House of Representatives (the first Arizona Republican
ever elected to the House) in 1952 revived the state’s competitive
59
Particularly noteworthy was the fact that
two-party system.
Goldwater defeated Ernest McFarland, the Democratic majority
60
leader of the Senate. Republicans also made sharp inroads in the
state legislature that year, and the GOP suddenly became a strong
61
Goldwater won a landslide victory in 1958,
force in Arizona.
62
although Arizona’s black precincts voted heavily against him. He
won this election, in part, with the help of volunteers like
Rehnquist: bright, aspiring white professionals who wanted to build
63
a national Republican party reflecting their conservative values.
Several factors aided the Republicans.
Conservative
newcomers from other states, hardworking volunteers, a pro-GOP
press, and popular candidates like Barry Goldwater, contributed to
64
their success. They also benefited from a split in the Democratic
Party between liberal activists, many of whom had moved to
Arizona after 1945, and the so-called Pinto Democrats, traditional

for eighteen months. Id. In 1953 Rehnquist moved to Phoenix where he
practiced law with four different firms until he moved to Washington, D.C. in 1969
to work as Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel, Department
of Justice. Id. Richard Kleindienst recommended Rehnquist to head the Office of
Legal Counsel after he took the number two position in the Justice Department
(Rehnquist had become a trusted friend and adviser to then-Arizona state party
chairman Kleindienst in the 1950s). Id. In 1971 Rehnquist was forty-seven years
old. Id. On Rehnquist’s relationship with Kleindienst, see DAVID G. SAVAGE,
TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST SUPREME COURT 39 (1993); BOLES,
supra note 52, at 17.
58. Republican voter registration dropped from thirty-three percent of the
total in 1928 to just twelve percent in 1940. DAVID R. BERMAN, ARIZONA POLITICS
AND GOVERNMENT: THE QUEST FOR AUTONOMY, DEMOCRACY, AND DEVELOPMENT 48–
51 (1998). Between 1933 and 1951, the GOP did not elect a single representative
to the Arizona senate. Id. In the Arizona house during those same years,
“Republican representation reached a high of eleven out of seventy-two seats.” Id.
at 48.
59. Id. at 51–56.
60. ROBERT ALAN GOLDBERG, BARRY GOLDWATER 131–32 (1995).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 132.
63. Id. at 127.
64. See id. at 125–32.
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conservatives who were alienated by the national Democratic
65
Party’s increasing support for black civil rights.
Nonetheless, while Republicans made steady progress after
66
1952, electoral contests in the state remained highly competitive.
In this context, African-Americans and Latinos played an important
67
role. Both groups were desperately poor.
Their situation—as
measured by the degree of residential and school segregation,
exclusion from public accommodations by an informal Jim Crow
system, and, in most respects, exclusion as well from the local
political system—was not so different from that of African
68
Americans in the South at the time. Barry Goldwater’s butler, Otis
Burns, told an interviewer many years later that the city “wasn’t any
69
better than a southern town.”
In 1960, African Americans made up 4.8 percent of Phoenix’s
70
residents, having declined from 6.5 percent in 1940. Residents
with Hispanic surnames, while growing in numbers along with the
71
For
general population, composed only 8.2 percent in 1960.
various reasons, including their low socio-economic status and their
younger average age, these two groups composed a much smaller

65. BERMAN, supra note 58, at 52–53, 63–64. According to Berman, many
conservative Democrats retained their registration in the Democratic Party to
influence politics in their counties but often voted for Republicans. Id. “Pinto” is
Spanish for a horse of two colors. See id. at 53.
66. Republican gains increased faster in the 1966 election because that year a
federal court instituted a new population-based apportionment system for the
Arizona senate and house. Id. at 54, 56. The previous geographically based system
favored farmers, ranchers, and miners. Id. at 54. The new plan gave significant
weight to the Republican stronghold in Phoenix (Maricopa County). Id. During
the postwar years, for the first time in Arizona history, Republicans captured the
state house and senate. Id. at 554–56.
67. See GOLDBERG, supra note 60, at 37–38.
68. BRADFORD LUCKINGHAM, PHOENIX: THE HISTORY OF A SOUTHWESTERN
METROPOLIS 171–76 (1989). See also Mary Melcher, Blacks and Whites Together:
Interracial Leadership in the Phoenix Civil Rights Movement, J. ARIZ. HIST. 32, 196–211
(Summer 1991). See generally Interview by Mary Melcher with the Rev. George B.
Brooks (Jan. 24, 1990) (on file with the Ariz. Historical Found., Hayden Library at
Ariz. State Univ.) (describing a first-hand account of these kinds of challenges
faced by African-Americans).
69. GOLDBERG, supra note 60, at 88; see also id. at 37–38, 88–89.
70. LUCKINGHAM, supra note 68, at 175.
71. Leonard E. Goodall, Phoenix: Reformers at Work, in URBAN POLITICS IN THE
SOUTHWEST 111 (Leonard E. Goodall ed., 1967). But see LUCKINGHAM, supra note
68, at 171 (stating that Hispanics made up fourteen percent of the population in
Phoenix in 1960).
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percentage of the city’s actual voters—probably less than ten
72
percent combined.
Still, in spite of these groups’ small proportion of the
electorate, Republicans took them seriously—not as groups to be
won over, but as ones that could frustrate Republican goals,
73
Historical memory also
particularly when elections were tight.
came into play. Democrats, after all, had taken over the state in the
74
African1930s with the support of new voters and Latinos.
75
Americans had also demonstrated they were not Goldwater fans.
The ballot security measures made famous by the Rehnquist
hearings can best be understood in this context.
The Republicans were especially blessed at this time with a
perfect rationale for focusing on minority, low-income precincts
that happened to vote Democratic: a state law requiring voters be
76
literate in English. The law was enacted shortly after achieving
statehood, as one historian described it, “to limit ‘the ignorant
Mexican vote’ . . . .” As recently as the 1960s, registrars applied the
test to reduce the ability of blacks, Indians, and Hispanics to
77
register to vote.” Arizona shared this racial barrier to voting with
several of the states of the Old South, a barrier there since the end
78
of Reconstruction. The use of the literacy test continued without
79
interruption until prohibited by the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

72. GOLDBERG, supra note 60, at 37–38. While black and Hispanic residents
contributed to a substantial minority of the population, “[o]f the twenty-nine
precincts in Phoenix, fourteen contained no blacks and seven more contained
fewer than ten black residents each.” Id. at 37. Both de facto and de jure
segregation and discrimination resulted in limited or even “no influence on
community decision-making.” Id. at 38; see also BERMAN, supra note 58, at 78–80
(describing Arizona’s “participation problem” related to age, non-citizen status,
and racial exclusion).
73. See Berman, supra note 58, at 64–65, 74–80 (describing the relationship
between minority voters and the political parties in Arizona).
74. Id. at 48–49.
75. GOLDBERG, supra note 60, at 132.
76. “[M]inority mobilization has tended to benefit Democrats.” BERMAN,
supra note 58, at 64. Republicans could use the law to challenge voters in
primarily Democratic precincts, which also happened to have minorities.
77. BERMAN, supra note 58, at 75.
78. Phoenix was comparable to the South with regard to discrimination. See
GOLDBERG, supra note 60, at 88; BERMAN, supra note 58, at 76–77 (stating that
Arizona and Alaska were the only non-southern states that had to comply with the
pre-clearance components of the Voting Rights Act, which required federal
approval of legal changes affecting voting rights, such as changing district
boundaries).
79. BERMAN, supra note 58, at 76.
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The Arizona legislature did not officially repeal the test, however,
until 1972: the year Rehnquist became a member of the Supreme
80
Court. But during the Republican ascendancy in Arizona, the
81
literacy test was a key tool with which to challenge minority voters.
As Arizona political historian David Berman describes it: “Anglos
sometimes challenged minorities at the polls and asked them to
read and explain ‘literacy’ cards. Intimidators hoped to discourage
82
minorities from standing in line to vote.”
83
The literacy test was not integral to vote caging. Nonetheless,
the caging incidents described in the Rehnquist nomination
hearings were employed in tandem with the tests, just as caging has
subsequently been used in conjunction with other forms of
suppression techniques.
A. Challenging Voters in Phoenix Minority Precincts
Experiments with ballot security in Phoenix began at least as
early as 1954, but the first large-scale ballot security drive took place
in 1958, when the Arizona Republican Party sent volunteers and
party leaders to ninety percent of Maricopa County’s 220 polling
places to turn out the Republican vote and challenge Democratic
84
85
voters’ qualifications. The first basis for challenge was residency.
Republicans mailed campaign literature to 18,000 Democrats
86
marked “Do not forward” and “Return postage guaranteed.” The
87
Equipped
returned mail was collected to form challenge lists.
with lists of voters whose current address apparently did not

80. Id. See also Ely v. Klahr, 403 U.S. 108 (1971) (regarding a challenge to
Arizona’s state legislative districting laws); Apache County v. United States, 256 F.
Supp. 903 (D.D.C. 1966) (upholding reinstatement of literacy testing,
distinguished from those barred by the Voting Rights Act, as a prerequisite to
voter registration); Venita Hawthorne James, Arizona’s Legacy of Prejudice, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, Jan. 12, 1991, at A2. For more on the relationship between minority
voters and the political parties, see BERMAN, supra note 58, at 64–65, 74–80.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 76–77.
82. BERMAN, supra note 58, at 76.
83. Other voter suppression and intimidation tactics were used in tandem
with Arizona’s literacy tests, as will become clear below.
84. Some GOP Vote Challengers Face Criminal Charges for Holding Posts, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, Nov. 5, 1958, at 4.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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correspond to their address of registration, GOP challengers tried
88
to disqualify the Democratic voters if they showed up at the polls.
The second basis for challenge in 1958 was literacy: challenged
89
voters had to be able to read from the U.S. Constitution. On
Election Day, Republicans sent challengers to confront potential
90
voters with passages from the Constitution.
According to
witnesses, the challengers (described as Anglos) flanked voters
(described as blacks or Latinos, and often elderly) and asked them
to read aloud a passage from the Constitution printed on a note
91
If the voter refused or could not read satisfactorily, the
card.
challengers often asked the person to leave the voting line,
although the law stipulated that the challenger could not harass or
92
intimidate the voter. To make matters even more confusing in
this particular election, contrary to the law, the Maricopa
Republican county chairman assigned poll-watchers and
challengers to selected precincts, when only the official precinct
93
committee had legal jurisdiction to do so.
Opponents of these practices argued that the GOP ballot
security programs attempted to disfranchise qualified minority
88. Id. The pro-GOP paper reported that Democrats were “obviously
surprised by the Republican program.” Id. Some Democrats retaliated in 1960
with postcards to 349 Republican voters in District 15 warning them of
“punishment” if they moved and voted in their former precinct. See Bill King,
Postcards Threaten GOP Voters, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 5, 1960, at 8. The unspecified
punishment included the loss of vote and perjury penalties for making false
affidavits. Id. The Democratic list was compiled on the basis of returned mailings
to registered Republicans. Id.
89. For descriptions of such challenges, see Senate Committee on the Judiciary:
Hearings on the Nominations of William H. Rehnquist, of Arizona, and Lewis F. Powell,
Jr., of Virginia, to be Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, 92nd
Cong. 295–96 (1971) (testimony of Clarence Mitchell, Director, Washington
Bureau, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and
Legislative Chairman, Leadership Conference On Civil Rights) [hereinafter
Nominations 1971] available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/senate/
judiciary/sh92-69-267/browse.html (describing challengers using the Arizona
State Constitution). See, e.g., Gene McLain, Fight Erupts At South Side Precinct, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, Nov. 7, 1962, at 11 (stating that under Arizona law, it was legal to use
the U.S. Constitution to challenge voters).
90. Nominations 1971, supra note 89, at 295–96.
91. Id.
92. Id. See Melcher, Blacks and Whites Together, supra note 68, at 208–09. See,
e.g., Interview by Mary Melcher with Rev. George B. Brooks (Jan. 31, 1991) (on file
with the Ariz. Historical Found., Hayden Library at Ariz. State. Univ.)
(documenting first-hand account of challenges at the voting precinct).
93. Some GOP Vote Challengers Face Criminal Charges For Holding Posts, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, Nov. 5, 1958, at 4.
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94

voters. Richard G. Kleindienst, Arizona GOP chairman in the late
1950s and attorney general under President Nixon, later denied
those claims, saying that Republicans “challenge in precincts where
it has been demonstrated in the past that some parts of the
Democratic organization in Maricopa County try to crowd into the
95
polls at the last minute people who are not qualified to vote.” But
The Arizona Republic only mentioned south side minority precincts
96
as the ones in which Republican challengers were active that year.
County Democratic chairman Vince Maggiore claimed that some of
the challengers were arrogating authority reserved for precinct
97
“There should be no place in Arizona for
election officials.
deliberate attempts to impede the voting of groups which have
98
fought so hard for their rights,” he said.
Other Democrats
claimed some Republican challengers were asking voters to read
sections of the Constitution “containing a lot of big and difficult
99
words.”
B. Events at a Polling Place in 1962: The 1971 Hearings
Rehnquist’s involvement in these disputed ballot security
programs came to light near the end of the 1971 Judiciary
Committee hearings when five witnesses sent sworn affidavits
accusing him of challenging and harassing voters with literacy tests
100
in the predominantly black Bethune precinct in 1964. They seem
94. See Melcher, Blacks and Whites Together, supra note 68, at 208–09.
95. McLain, supra note 89, at 11.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. The fight here involved Republican challenger Wayne Bentson and
Democratic Party representative Pat Marino. Id. at 1. Several witnesses in
Rehnquist’s 1971 confirmation hearings apparently confused Rehnquist with
Bentson. Nominations 1971, supra note 89, at 290. Poll-watchers were active in
seven minority South Side precincts plus Sky Harbor, Parkview, and Okemah.
McLain, supra note 89, at 11. The 1962 Phoenix ballot security campaign also
included turning out the Republican vote. Election Puzzles Experts, ARIZ. REPUBLIC,
Nov. 8, 1962, at 11. In this non-presidential election, more than seventy percent of
registered voters made the trip to the polls. Id. The Arizona Republic credited the
turnout to Republican organization. Id.
100. GOP ballot security programs were not the only reason for opposition to
Rehnquist. After his 1971 nomination, a memo came to light which Rehnquist
wrote during his clerkship for Justice Robert Jackson in support of the 1896 Plessy
v. Ferguson decision upholding the segregationist doctrine of “separate but equal.”
TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 2 (2000).
Rehnquist claimed that the views were those of Jackson, not his—a contention
strongly denied by Jackson’s long-time secretary, who called Rehnquist’s account
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to have confused Rehnquist with Wayne Bentson, a Republican
who challenged voters to read from his note card at the Bethune
precinct in 1962 and was involved in a scuffle with a Democratic
101
Party representative that year.
But accurate information that
Rehnquist had trained GOP challengers prevented the Senate from
102
ignoring the charges.
The evidence included an FBI
103
investigation of voting interference in Arizona in the 1960s;
relevant testimony from Clarence Mitchell, director of the NAACP
Washington Bureau and legislative chairman for the Leadership
104
Conference on Civil Rights; and a letter from Superior Court
Judge Charles L. Hardy explaining in general terms how some of
105
the state’s voters were intimidated in 1962. Judge Hardy’s letter
shed a harsh light on the GOP ballot security activities:
In each precinct [with overwhelmingly Democratic
registrants] every black or Mexican person was being
challenged [that he or she was unable to read the
Constitution of the United States in the English language]
and it was quite clear that this type of challenging was a
deliberate effort to slow down the voting so as to cause
people awaiting their turn to vote to grow tired of waiting
and leave without voting. In addition, there was a well
organized campaign of outright harassment and
intimidation to discourage persons from attempting to
“incredible on its face” and added that Rehnquist has “smeared the reputation of a
great justice.” Id. at 5. Other issues that opponents raised included Rehnquist’s
opposition to a public accommodations ordinance in Phoenix in 1964, to a civil
rights march in Arizona during the spring of 1964, and to desegregation in
Arizona high schools in 1967. Nominations 1971, supra note 89, at 290. Opponents
also questioned his opposition to the publication of the Pentagon papers and his
support for government powers of surveillance. Id. at 289–361, 483–92. See
generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 765–82 (1975) (arguing
the re-emergence of separate-but-equal jurisprudence after Rehnquist became
Chief Justice by detailing the Court’s handling of desegregation cases).
101. McLain, supra note 89, at 11.
102. The five witnesses were Democratic poll-watchers Robert Tate and Jordan
Harris, the Rev. George B. Brooks, and the Rev. and Mrs. Snelson W. McGriff.
Fred P. Graham, 2 Negroes From Phoenix, Ariz., Say Rehnquist Harassed Blacks at Polls
in 1964, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1971, at 32; Donald Janson, Rights Aide Calls Rehnquist
Racist, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1971, at 46. For the information on Wayne Bentson, see
McLain, supra note 89, at 1, 11. Rehnquist denied ever being in the Bethune
Precinct on Election Day 1964, which sheds little light on his role in this situation
since the event took place in 1962. Nominations 1971, supra note 89, at 492.
103. Id. at 297.
104. Id. at 295. For Mitchell’s testimony, see id. at 289–98.
105. Id. at 486.
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vote. In the black and brown areas, handbills were
distributed warning persons that if they were not properly
qualified to vote they would be prosecuted. There were
squads of people taking photographs of voters standing in
line waiting to vote and asking for their names[.] There is
no doubt in my mind that these tactics of harassment,
intimidation and indiscriminate challenging were highly
106
improper and violative of the spirit of free elections.
These factors prompted the Senate to submit written questions
to Rehnquist concerning his involvement in elections from 1958 to
107
1968. Rehnquist was asked if he had ever personally challenged
voters, or if he had trained or counseled poll-watchers or
108
challengers. He was also asked if he had ever prepared, selected,
or advised on the use of printed passages from the Constitution for
109
In addition, he was asked when such
literacy challenges.
practices came to his attention and if he thought the practices
110
lawful or took action to curb them.
Rehnquist responded: “In
none of these years did I personally engage in challenging the
111
qualifications of any voters.”
He denied recruiting challengers
but admitted that he had spoken at a challengers’ school to train
112
He also distanced himself from the practice of literacy
them.
challenges, which he asserted he never prepared, selected, or
113
advised. “No such practice came to my attention until sometime
114
“The manner in
on Election Day, 1962,” Rehnquist claimed.
106. Id. (quoting Letter from Hardy to Mississippi Senator James Eastland,
Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary).
107. Id. at 485.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 491.
112. Rehnquist recalled speaking at the challengers’ school for the 1960, 1962,
and perhaps the 1964 elections:
The purpose of my talk was to advise the various persons who were to act
as challengers as to what authorization was required in order to enable
them to be present in a polling place during the time the election was
being conducted, and also as to the various legal grounds for challenging
as provided by applicable Arizona law. My recollection is that I simply
recited the grounds set forth in the Arizona Revised Statutes as to the
basis for challenge, the method of making the challenge, and the
manner in which the challenge was to be decided by the Election Board
of the precinct in question.
Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss2/4

20

Davidson et al.: Vote Caging as a Republican Ballot Security Technique
DAVIDSON - ADC

2008]

1/31/2008 11:00:49 AM

VOTE CAGING

553

which I saw this type of challenge being used, when I visited one
precinct, struck me as amounting to harassment and intimidation,
and I advised the Republican challenger to stop using these
115
tactics.”
Rehnquist also claimed that when he saw one Republican
challenger “going down the line and requiring prospective voters
to read some passage of the Constitution, rather than presenting
his challenge to the Election Board in an orderly way,” he “advised
him to stop this practice, and to make any challenges in the
116
manner provided by the law.”
In response to Judge Hardy’s
description of GOP challengers in 1962 deliberately slowing down
voting lines and intimidating and harassing voters by
photographing them and recording their names, Rehnquist
explained that before 1962 Republican challengers concerned
themselves with preventing unregistered persons or persons who
117
had changed their residence from voting.
“I did not realize the
change in emphasis of some of the Republican challengers in 1962
until sometime during Election Day of that year. I therefore feel
that there was no connection between my role and the
118
circumstances related by Judge Hardy.”
Rehnquist’s sworn response forced senators to make a choice.
They could believe the nominee, who stated he neither intimidated
and harassed voters nor supported such measures, or they could
believe his opponents, who linked him to GOP ballot security
efforts, but could not prove that he had harassed and intimidated
119
John P. Frank, “a leading constitutional and Supreme
voters.
Court expert in Phoenix,” wrote in the Washington Post that
Rehnquist “has been an intellectual force for reaction. . . . He
120
honestly doesn’t believe in civil rights and will oppose them.”
The American Civil Liberties Union joined the debate, breaking a
fifty-two year position of never opposing a nominee for public

115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 491–92.
118. Id. at 492.
119. Graham, supra note 102, at 32 (documenting that affidavits from witnesses
in the 1971 hearings confused Rehnquist with Bentson, and the year 1964 with
1962).
120. BOLES, supra note 52, at 77–78 (quoting a November 1, 1971 Washington
Post article).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008

21

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 4
DAVIDSON - ADC

554

1/31/2008 11:00:49 AM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:2

office, when it publicly called for the defeat of Rehnquist as “a
121
dedicated opponent of individual civil liberties.”
The national debate on Rehnquist’s resistance to civil rights
122
brought attention and controversy to the hearings. The senators
were under pressure to reach a conclusion, because the Court, with
123
two vacant seats, had been in session since early October. Finally,
they voted: sixty-eight senators sided with Rehnquist, twenty-six with
124
Lewis Powell’s simultaneous confirmation was
his opponents.
125
much more decisive at eighty-nine to one.
C. Events at a Polling Place in 1962: The 1986 Hearings
Publicity about ballot security programs in Arizona resurfaced
in 1986 when President Ronald Reagan nominated Rehnquist for
126
Chief Justice.
Ironically, 1986 was the same year the RNC was
involved in a major scandal involving efforts to disfranchise African
Americans in Louisiana using a type of return-mail registration
127
This time,
verification Arizona Republicans used in the 1950s.
128
Rehnquist’s opponents were better organized and more credible.
During his confirmation hearings, Senator Edward Kennedy of
Massachusetts charged that Rehnquist “led a Republican Party
ballot security program designed to disenfranchise minority voters”
129
in the early 1960s.
Kennedy’s charges were in accord with a 1971 New York Times
article stating that Rehnquist was co-chairman of the GOP ballot
security program in 1960, trained challengers in 1962 when he was
chairman of the lawyer’s committee of the Maricopa County
Republican Party, and was chairman of the ballot security program
130
Kennedy asserted that Rehnquist “held a high and
in 1964.
121. Id. at 11 (quoting AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, CIVIL LIBERTIES 8
(1972)).
122. See generally id. at 3–12 (discussing events surrounding Justice Rehnquist's
nomination).
123. Id. at 3.
124. DAVIS, supra note 55, at 7.
125. Id.
126. BOLES, supra note 52, at 86.
127. See DAVIDSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 60.
128. See generally BOLES, supra note 52, at 86–90 (discussing witness testimony
and referencing documents during confirmation hearings).
129. Nomination of William H. Rehnquist to be Chief Justice of the United States, 132
CONG. REC. S12378-04 (1986).
130. See Fred P. Graham, Rehnquist Role in Election Confirmed, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
13, 1971, at 37.
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responsible position in the election day apparatus from at least
1960 to 1964, a period that saw very substantial harassment and
131
intimidation of voters in minority group precincts.”
New and credible witnesses also testified or submitted sworn
132
affidavits about Rehnquist’s roles in ballot security programs.
James Brosnahan, in 1962 an assistant U.S. attorney in Arizona,
later a U.S. attorney, and in 1986 a senior partner at a San
Francisco law firm with cases before the Supreme Court, provided
133
the most credible refutation of Rehnquist’s sworn statements.
During the Judiciary Committee hearings, he explained that he
had not come forward in 1971 because he had not known that
134
events in south Phoenix in 1962 were a focus of the hearings.
Unlike witnesses at the earlier hearings who mistook
Rehnquist for another challenger, Brosnahan knew Rehnquist
135
personally.
He had attended Phoenix bar association functions
136
Brosnahan testified
with him and introduced his wife to him.
137
that he did not see Rehnquist challenge voters. But in his official
capacity as an assistant U.S. attorney, he was called to a polling

131. Id.; Nomination of William H. Rehnquist to be Chief Justice of the United States,
132 CONG. REC. S12.378-04 (1986). Rehnquist’s responsibilities, according to
Kennedy, included the following: In 1960, Rehnquist supervised and assisted in
the preparation of envelopes mailed to Democrats—largely in African-American
and Mexican-American districts—which were the foundation of residency
challenges; he recruited lawyers to serve on a lawyer’s committee; he advised
challengers on the law; and he supervised in assembling returns of the mailings for
challenging purposes. Id. In 1962, Rehnquist again taught challengers the
procedures they were to use. Id. And, as in 1960, “he served as a troubleshooter,
going to precincts at which disputes had arisen in order to help resolve them. In
1964, Rehnquist had overall responsibility for mailing out envelopes, recruiting
challengers and members of the lawyer's committee, and speaking, or seeing that
someone spoke, at a training session of challengers.” Id. See also YARBROUGH, supra
note 100, at 1–11 (discussing a wide array of issues during the 1986 hearings). For
more information on other contentious issues during the 1986 hearings see id.
132. See generally BOLES, supra note 52, at 86–90 (discussing the testimony of
four witnesses who had not participated in the 1971 hearings).
133. Id. at 86–87.
134. Nomination of Justice William Hubbs Rehnquist: Hearings before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 1007–08 (1986) [hereinafter Hearings 1986] (statement of
James Brosnahan, Attorney, Morrison & Forrester). He came forward in 1986
because he received a call ten days prior to his appearance before the committee
requesting his testimony. Id. at 996. He claimed he would have had misgivings if
he had not come forward. See id. at 1007.
135. Id. at 986.
136. Id. at 1012. For Brosnahan’s entire testimony, see id. at 984–1040.
137. Id. at 995–96.
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138

place in 1962 in order to investigate claims of harassment.
“At
that polling place, I saw William Rehnquist, who was known to me
as an attorney practicing in the city of Phoenix,” Brosnahan
139
testified.
Rehnquist, he said, was the only challenger present
140
The atmosphere was very tense; the voters
when he arrived.
waiting in line told him that Rehnquist was challenging, and they
141
complained about the aggressiveness of the challenging.
Brosnahan talked with Rehnquist, who “did not deny he was a
challenger. At that time in 1962, he did not raise any question
142
about credentials or any of that. He did not deny that.”
Brosnahan further testified that while talking to Rehnquist
about the complaints against him, Rehnquist’s comments indicated
143
that he had been challenging voters. Brosnahan stated his views
on events that occurred in south Phoenix in 1962: “Based on
interviews with voters, polling officials, and my fellow assistant U.S.
attorneys, it was my opinion in 1962 that the challenging effort was
designed to reduce the number of black and Hispanic voters by
144
confrontation and intimidation.”
“The thrust of the effort,” he
continued later, “was to confront voters, to challenge them, in
hope that they would be intimidated, that they would not stand in
line, that they would be fearful that maybe they would be
145
embarrassed.”
Other witnesses corroborated Brosnahan’s testimony that the
nominee challenged and intimidated minority voters in Phoenix.
Dr. Sydney Smith, a professor of psychology and former professor
at Arizona State University, was not certain if it was election day in
1960 or 1962, but he was certain he heard Rehnquist tell two black
voters in line, after asking them to read, “You have no business in
146
this line trying to vote. I would ask you to leave.” Melvin Mirkin,
an attorney in Phoenix who supported Rehnquist’s nomination,
testified that he saw Rehnquist intimidate voters by encouraging
them to leave the line at a minority polling place and instructing
138. Id. at 989.
139. Id. at 985.
140. Id. at 989.
141. Id. at 985.
142. Id. at 994.
143. Id. at 1008–09, 1011–12, 1038–39. For descriptions of voters identifying
Rehnquist as an aggressive challenger, see id. at 1024–26.
144. Id. at 989.
145. Id. at 1007.
146. Id. at 1007–08 (statement of Dr. Sydney Smith). For Smith’s entire
testimony, see id. at 1054–65.
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Republican challengers loudly enough for voters to hear that
147
unregistered or illiterate people would not be allowed to vote.
These charges became a central obstacle to Rehnquist’s
confirmation as Chief Justice. He again denied them and claimed
that his recollection was not good enough to give more detailed
148
When Kennedy asked Rehnquist whether he
information.
challenged individuals, Rehnquist replied: “I don’t think you—I
149
Kennedy
think it was simply watching the vote being counted.”
bore in: “Well you’d remember whether you challenged them now,
Mr. Justice, wouldn’t you. Did you at any time challenge any
150
Rehnquist tried to explain that a challenger was
individual?”
authorized by law to go to a polling place most often to watch the
151
vote being counted. Kennedy then read aloud from Rehnquist’s
1971 affidavit in which the nominee swore that he did not
intimidate or harass voters or encourage such behavior in 1964 or
152
at any other time from 1958 to 1968.
“So you might have
challenged them,” Kennedy queried, “but you didn’t intimidate or
153
harass them, I guess is the way I should conclude.”
Rehnquist
responded: “Well, I’ve answered all of your questions the best I can,
154
155
I think.” Kennedy did not press further for an answer.
Senators again faced the choice of believing Rehnquist or his
opponents, only this time they had to decide whether a sitting
Supreme Court Justice rather than a mere nominee to the Court
was not truthful. In making their decision, senators had to sort
156
In 1986,
through confusing aspects of Rehnquist’s testimony.
Kennedy pressed Rehnquist on his 1971 affidavit in which
147. Id. at 1040–48 (statement of Melvin J. Merkin, Attorney); see also Robert
Lindsey, Rehnquist in Arizona: A Militant Conservative in 60’s Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
4, 1986, at A7 (generally citing testimony of witnesses who said Rehnquist
challenged minority voters); Stuart Taylor, Jr., Rehnquist Says He Didn’t Deter Voters
in 60’s, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1986, at A1.
148. For an overview of the charges against Rehnquist, see Excerpts from
Questioning of Rehnquist in the Senate Judiciary Committee, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1986, at
A14 [hereinafter Excerpts]. Rehnquist had to refute testimony from several
witnesses, including Arizona State Senator Manuel Peña. Hearings 1986, supra note
134, at 1065–78 (statement of Manuel Peña, Sen., State of Arizona).
149. Excerpts, supra note 148, at A14.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See id.
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Rehnquist wrote: “In none of these years [1958 to 1968] did I
157
personally engage in challenging the qualifications of any voters.”
This carefully crafted statement apparently did not mean that
Rehnquist denied ever having been involved in the process of
158
challenging voters at the polls. It seemed to mean that he did not
159
personally confront or question them only during those years.
He could have presented a challenge to the election board official
“in the manner provided by the law,” and the official would have
160
personally challenged the voter. This, of course, contradicted the
161
testimony of Brosnahan and Smith. There was also a question of
chronology. Rehnquist denied “personally challenging” voters
between 1958 and 1968, but according to a New York Times article,
he admitted that he may have personally questioned voters’ literacy
162
in 1964.
Senators also had to decide what defined harassment and
intimidation in the context of legal literacy challenges to Arizona
voters before 1964. Stuart Taylor, Jr., a journalist for The New York
Times, opined that Rehnquist may not have equated challenging
with stopping people in line at polling places and asking them to
163
John Dean, former counsel to
demonstrate their qualifications.
President Nixon, who claims he was the first to suggest Rehnquist
as a candidate for the court in 1971, believes “that Rehnquist was
164
But he
not truthful about his activities in challenging voters.”
added, contrary to the testimony of Brosnahan and others, “I don’t
believe Rehnquist ‘harassed’ black voters ever, for that is not his
style or nature. Yet I have no doubt he challenged black voters at a
165
time when it was perfectly legal in Arizona to do so.” Rehnquist’s
157. Nominations 1971, supra note 89, at 491.
158. See Taylor, supra note 147, at A1.
159. See id.
160. See discussion supra Part III.B. “[I]n the manner provided by the law” is
the advice Rehnquist reportedly gave to a Republican challenger whom Rehnquist
claimed he reprimanded in 1962 for personally questioning voters as they stood in
line to vote. Nominations 1971, supra note 89, at 491.
161. See supra notes 134–147 and accompanying text.
162. See Taylor, supra note 147, at A1.
Justice Rehnquist . . . also said he did not recall approaching any voters in
those years [1958 to 1968] to question them about their qualifications or
to ask them to prove their ability to read, as several people have alleged.
But he said it was possible he had taken such an action in 1964.
Id.
163. Id.
164. DEAN, supra note 51, at 273.
165. Id.
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careful language and his status as a sitting Supreme Court Justice
were determinative in the end. He was confirmed as Chief Justice.
While the 1986 hearings did not prevent Rehnquist’s elevation
to Chief Justice, they dramatically brought attention to
Republicans’ purposeful targeting and intimidation of minority
voters under the guise of ballot security in the 1950s and 1960s.
The Arizona story illustrates important features of vote caging
as a discriminatory phenomenon. Political operatives belonging to
one party caged voters who were predominantly members of ethnic
minority groups likely to vote for the other party. The caging
consisted of using do-not-forward letters to identify people who
might not be properly registered. Then, on election day, at least
some of the partisan operatives—including lawyers—went beyond
simply asking election officials to challenge the voters who were on
the caging list. In some cases, the operatives attempted to apply
literacy tests and were abrasive and threatening. Their intervention
sometimes slowed the lines of voters. Moreover, they sometimes
broke the election law by arrogating to themselves the roles of
challenging the voters’ registration and of applying literacy tests
when those roles were legally assigned to election officials.
IV. VOTE CAGING SINCE THE 1960S
America is a large nation with thousands of elections every year
at every level of government. There is no systematic effort by
government, political activists, or scholars to scientifically
monitor—either in toto or using statistical sampling techniques—
vote suppression efforts. Hence, it would be impossible to estimate
accurately how widespread caging has been since Rehnquist’s
involvement in it almost fifty years ago.
The authors of this article wrote a report in 2004 that focused
on some of the more widely reported instances of vote caging since
166
the post-World War II era.
There was, for example, the
Republican Party’s national ballot security program in 1964, named
167
Operation Eagle Eye. In addition, the RNC was involved in vote
caging during the 1981 New Jersey gubernatorial election. This
incident led to a 1982 consent decree in the court of Judge
Dickinson R. Debevoise, prohibiting either the RNC or the
Democratic National Committee from engaging in some of the
166.
167.

DAVIDSON ET AL., supra note 24.
Id. at 25.
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more egregious forms of vote suppression—in particular, racial
168
In 1986, a major caging effort by Republicans in a
targeting.
Louisiana senatorial race was enjoined by a federal judge, which
led to the RNC being required to appear before Judge Debevoise
once again and agree to submit all its future ballot security
169
programs to his court for approval—an agreement still in effect.
There was ample evidence that the vote caging was racially
targeted. An RNC operative in Louisiana wrote to a fellow
operative in 1986, “I would guess that this program will eliminate at
least 60-80,000 folks from the rolls. . . . If it’s a close race . . . which
I’m assuming it is, this could keep the black vote down
170
considerably.”
Another widely noted example of caging occurred in the 1990
North Carolina contest between Republican U.S. Senator Jesse
171
Helms and his black Democratic challenger Harvey Gantt.
In
that contest, the state Republican apparatus in conjunction with
the Helms campaign sent out two mailings of first-class mail
172
postcards containing false and threatening information. The first
(81,000 cards) was sent to precincts in which ninety-four percent of
the voters were black, and the second (44,000 cards) was sent
173
The Gantt campaign reported
exclusively to black voters.
instances in which biracial couples received cards addressed only to
174
One of the purposes of both
the black member of the family.
mailings was to obtain a list of black registrants whose cards were
returned as undeliverable, in order to challenge them at the polls
175
on election day.
In the wake of Goodling’s May 2007 testimony, reports by nonprofit organizations have shed more light on caging and its history.
The Brennan Center for Justice presented a chronological account

168. Id. at 48–49. See Consent Order, Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Republican
Nat’l Comm., Civ. No. 81-3876 (D.N.J. Nov. 1, 1982).
169. DAVIDSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 60.
170. Thomas B. Edsall, “Ballot Security” Effects Calculated; GOP Aide Said
Louisiana Effort “Could Keep the Black Vote Down,” WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 1986, at A1.
171. DAVIDSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 72.
172. Michael Isikoff, Justice Dept. Investigates GOP Mailings to Voters, WASH. POST,
Nov. 6, 1990, at A6.
173. Levitt & Allison, Reported Instances of Vote Caging, supra note 21, at 1–5.
174. Isikoff, supra note 172, at A6.
175. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, United States v. N.C.
Republican Party, No. 91-161-CIU 5 F, 5–9 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 26, 1992).
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from the early years in Arizona mentioned above to five instances
176
in 2004 in Ohio, Nevada, Pennsylvania, Florida, and Wisconsin.
Other actual or intended voter challenges by Republicans in
2002 or later, which may have involved caging lists derived from
techniques other than direct mail, are mentioned by Teresa James
of Project Vote. She documents instances that occurred in
Wisconsin in 2002 and 2004; North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, and Kentucky in 2004; Washington in 2005; and New York
177
in 2006.
Events in Wisconsin in 2004 indicate a new twist to caging
178
techniques, which James calls “virtual caging.” As she describes it:
In lieu of an expensive and time-consuming direct mail
caging operation, the 2004 Wisconsin Republican
operation was unique in that it used a computer program
to identify and scrutinize registered voters.
The
Republican group first used freedom-of-information laws
to obtain the names of new voters, and then ran
background checks on them, according to a
contemporary Wall Street Journal report. Republicans
checked the addresses of more than 300,000 people
registered to vote in Milwaukee with a software program
used by the U.S. Postal Service to determine if addresses
were valid. Armed with the results of the virtual caging
operation, the Republican Party filed challenges against
the registrations of about 5,600 Milwaukee voters just
three minutes before the deadline. As in other states, the
party then launched a major media campaign to disclose
179
its findings and lodge charges of voter fraud.
In most or all the above accounts of caging, the authors have
presumably relied on random media accounts or lawyers connected
to political parties. Another approach to ascertaining the extent of
this technique would involve a systematic tally of potential caging
problems throughout the country, as reported to vote-protection
hotlines in national elections. One such hotline project has
recently reported its tally of all complaints, not necessarily involving
180
Conducted under the auspices of
caging, from voters in 2006.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Levitt & Allison, Reported Instances of Vote Caging, supra note 21, at 1–5.
James, supra note 21, at 21–25.
Id. at 21.
Id.
CHRISTOPHER PATUSKY ET AL., MYVOTE1 NATIONAL ELECTION REPORT: VOICE
OF THE ELECTORATE 2006, 7 (2007), http://www.fels.upenn.edu/Reports/myvote1
_report_8_20_07.pdf.
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the Fels Institute of Government at the University of Pennsylvania,
Project MyVote1 found a slight rise from 2004 to 2006 (from 4.0 to
181
5.4) in the percentage of hotline complaints of coercion.
Coercion was defined as intentional bad behavior “including
harassment by campaign or polling place workers inside or just
182
outside the polling place,” as distinct from poor administration.
While constituting a small proportion of all problems on Election
Day, these data suggest that problems sometimes associated with a
183
caging operation still occur widely and are perhaps increasing.
In the current politically-charged atmosphere, when many
Republicans assert that Democratic vote fraud is rampant, it
appears likely that vote caging, both in its traditional direct-mail
version and its more imaginative forms, will continue to be part of
184
Whether it will be effective in
the Republican arsenal.
suppressing votes depends on several factors that are beyond the
scope of this essay. Among them are the willingness of Republicans
to risk the bad publicity that accompanies publicly exposed illegal
vote-caging efforts, as well as the aggressiveness of both the media
and election-protection organizations in identifying and exposing
185
These factors, in turn, may themselves be
such efforts.
influenced by the outcome of the continuing investigation of the
facts surrounding the sudden firing of U.S. attorneys by the Bush
administration in 2006, including the facts concerning the caging
lists sent by Timothy Griffin alluded to in the congressional
186
testimony of Monica Goodling.

181. Id. at 6.
182. Id. at 7.
183. Id. at 7.
184. For more discussion of Republican claims about Democratic vote fraud,
see DAVIDSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 25–26 (explaining that the Republican
national campaign, Operation Eagle Eye, was implemented specifically to counter
expected Democratic fraud); see also LORRAINE C. MINNITE, THE POLITICS OF VOTER
FRAUD (2007) available at http://projectvote.org/fileadmin/ProjectVote/
Publications/Politics_of_Voter_Fraud_Final.pdf (finding little evidence of voter
fraud); Dan Eggen & Amy Goldstein, Voter-Fraud Complaints by GOP Drove Dismissals,
WASH. POST, May 14, 2007, at A4 (reporting that recent U.S. Attorney firings were
the result of Republican Justice Department officials targeting those seen weak on
prosecuting voter fraud).
185. A useful summary of litigation regarding discriminatory vote caging and
ways to prevent it is found in James, supra note 21, at 26–35.
186. See McClure & Schwartz, supra note 3.
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